Was This An Efficient Accident?
A Los Angeles woman claims she was injured by her Victoria's Secret thong, prompting her to sue the underwear manufacturer.What's the more efficient standard for tort law in cases like this, strict liability or negligence? Or does it matter?
The plaintiff in the case, Macrida Patterson, 52, attributed the May 2007 injury to a Victoria's Secret "low-rise v-string," according to a court document posted on The Smoking Gun.
Patterson's lawyer told The Smoking Gun that a "design problem" caused a decorative metallic piece on the underwear to fly up and hit Patterson in the eye while she was putting the underwear on.
The traditional law & economics answer is to select the regime which will induce the risks to be born by the least-cost bearer of the risk.
- Perhaps this was an efficient accident, i.e., it was an accident that it would cost more to prevent than the expected costs resulting from the accident. Of course to truly assess the efficiency of the accident, one must consider the dot product of (a) the vector of all possible probabilties of accidents and (b) the vector of costs of those accidents, should they materialize.
- If it was not an efficient accident, Victoria's Secret was negligent. To promote economic efficiency, they should be held liable. And if they are held strictly liable (they must pay compensation, even if they were not negligent), they will tend to prevent only those accidents which are inefficient, but choose to pay compensation for those that are efficient.
- If it was an efficient accident, who is the least-cost bearer of the risk: customers or the firm? We seem, increasingly, to assign this risk to large firms, not because they are any better insurers than consumers, but because they have more money. The result is that such cases are decided more on distributional than efficiency criteria.





The quirk with product liability relative to traditional negligence was the joint liability of the entire distributive chain: you could sue not only the manufacturer, but also the wholesaler and retailer. But there still had to be defect somewhere in design, manufacture or labelling for anyone in the distributive chain to be liable. That was indeed a "deep pockets" policy decision (i.e., your #3), but it has been abandoned in at least some jurisdictions and contexts (e.g., a retailer who merely sells sealed containers with no ability to inspect the product now cannot be held liable for a manufacturing defect, at least in some jurisdictions).
"Strict liability," meanwhile, was generally only used for the tort of trespass: If your cow wandered onto your neighbor's land and did damage, then you were responsible, even if you were not negligent. "Negligence" as a tort didn't even really exist before the Industrial Revolution.
The only other common example of strict liability I can think of is for dog bites -- and even that isn't true in all jurisdictions (some use a negligence standard).
Your economic analysis is spot on -- the low-cost avoider should have the burden of avoidance. But that analysis is basically subsumed by the precedent question of whether the manufacturer was somehow negligent. It's really the same question, just asked in a different way.
Cheers...
All the major Law and Economics texts refer to strict liability as generally holding a given party liable even if there was no negligence. See, e.g., Cole and Grossman, Chpt 11, which says,
I think both the Posner and the Cooter-Uhlen texts say it even better, but all have recent citations showing the breadth of use of the term and the concept; for example see Posner, pp 178 - 80 in the 7th edition. And Polinkski's intro to Law and Econ has a section on it, too. But I don't have his text handy right now.